A Simple Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis Revisited by Dastani, Parsis et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Dastani, Parsis; Laisney, François; Vouillaume, Sophie
Working Paper
A Simple Test of the Efficiency Wage
Hypothesis Revisited
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 97-23
Provided in cooperation with:
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Suggested citation: Dastani, Parsis; Laisney, François; Vouillaume, Sophie (1997) : A Simple


















Economic ResearchA Simple Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis
Revisited
Parsis Dastani1, Ftan~ois Laisney2 and Sophie Vouillaume3
Abstract
Gerlach and Stephan (1994) proposed a test based on the idea that the "wage premi-
urn", the part of the wage which is not explained by the stock of human capital, should
help predict variables such as career expectations (quit, changeoccupation, leave thelabour
force) and some job characteristics (like degree of supervision). We examine a number of
issues related to sample selection and split, as well as the choice of tenure and experience
variables, and obtain surprisingly robust results, which differ somewhat from theirs: in
particular, we find no effect ofthe wage premium on career expectations. The main source
of these differences appears to lie in the pooling of Germans and foreigners.
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This study reconsiders results obtained by Gerlach and Stephan (1994) concerning a simple
test 01 the efficiency wage hypothesis. Their test is based on the idea that the part of the
wage which is not explained by the stock of human capital should help predict variables
such as career expectations (quit, change occupation leave the labour force) and some job
characteristics (like degree of supervision), which can be directly related to the efficiency wage
arguments. Using the same data set, the German Socia-Economic Panel for the years 1985,
1987 and 1989, we follow their procedure and first estimate earnings equations. The residuals
of these are then related to career expectations and job characteristics. However, we motivate
a different selection rule and treat the subsamples of Germans and foreigners separately for
the earnings equations but jointlyin the second stage. We also investigate different treatments
of the experience and tenure variables. In the end we reach the same conclusions as Gerlach
and Stephan concerning the relationship between job characteristics and wage premia, but
obtain diverging results as regards career expectations. By pooling Germans and foreigners
while keeping to a narrow range of hours we obtain some limited convergence towards their
results. Including hours of work in the regressions deteriorates the specification test results,
but it brings no notable change to the second stage results, i.e. to the test of the efficiency
wage hypothesis.
A tentative general conclusion we would like to draw is that there might be substantial
rewards for studies based on the GSOEP in avoiding to pool samples A et B - or Germans
and foreigners.
21. Introduction
Direct tests of the efficiency wage hypothesis are rendered difficult by the nature
of the variables involved in the theoretical model: ideally, a direct measure of
effort should be available, as well as a precise measure of the alternative wage
available to each worker. We shall not attempt to survey the literature on em-
pirical tests of that assumption - a good survey is provided in the introduction
of the paper by Agell (1994)-, but it is probably worth stressing the wealth of
identification problems associated with such an endeavour, as this suggests that
the proper data to conduct such tests convincingly should be matched data on
firms and employees, as used by Abowd et al. (1994) with a related, but distinct
focus.
Researchers having only household dataat their disposal have typically tried to
oppose compensating differentials and efficiency wage arguments, in an indirect
way based on the estimation of various types of earnings or wage equations (see
for instance Bellmann, 1992). The idea of the test proposed by Gerlach and
Stephan (1994) is of a similar vein: they argue that the "wage premium", the
part of the wage which is not explained by the stock of human capital, should
help predict variables such as career expectations (quit, change occupation, leave
the labour force) and some job characteristics (like degree of supervision), which
can be directly related to the efficiency wage arguments. We shall not question
that view but focus on the relationship between earnings and the stock ofhuman
capital.
Using basicallythesamedataset, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP),
for the years 1985, 1987 and 1989, we follow the procedure ofGerlach and Stephan
(henceforth GS) and estimate earnings equations, the residuals of which are re-
lated in a second stage to a series ofvariables which are pertinent to the efficiency
wage hypothesis. However, we motivate a different selection rule and treat the
subsamples of Germans and foreigners separately for the earnings equations but
jointly in the second stage.
In the terminology of Arulampalam et al. (1997), this study is are-analysis
rather than a strict replication of the GS study. In fact, our first intention had
3been to investigate non-linearities in the wage-human capital relationship, along
the lines of Bierens and Hartog (1988) and Lee et al. (1996), and their possible
impact on the results of the proposed test for the efficiency wage hypothesis.
However, along the way we reached the conclusion that the two subsamples of
Germans and foreigners were best analysed separately. The resulting smallish
sample sizes then left little scope for the identification of non-linearities.
In section 2we consider a number ofissues related tosample selection and split,
as well as the choice of tenure and experience variables. In section 3 we present
estimation and test results for the earnings equations. Section 4 presents the
test results pertaining to the efficiency wage hypothesis. These are surprisingly
robust to the choice of specification and estimation method. They differ in some
respects from the results of Gerlach and Stephan: in particular, we find no effect
of the wage premium on expectations. Section 5 investigates possible sources of
the differences between our results and those of Gerlach and Stephan. We look
at results obtained separately for German and foreigners in the second stage and
at results obtained by pooling the two subsamples throughout. We also estimate
their specification both with and without hours of work as explanatory variable
in the earnings equation, but with our sample selection. The results are stable
for the job characteristics, but extremely unstable for the career expectations.
The only specifications for which career expectations appear to be significantly
related to wage premia are those for which the two subsamples are pooled.
2. Specification issues
We now discuss a number ofissues that could be raised in connection with the GS
study. We do not mean to systematically criticise the choices they have made.
These are consistent and respectable, but other choices can be made, with a
series of implications. There is an inevitable compromise to be reached between
retaining enough observations to ensure power in testing, and duly accounting
for heterogeneity.
42.1 Hours and sample selection
While we understand the wish of Gerlach and Stephan to avoid losing observa-
tions by restricting hours, and the subsequent need to control for variation in
these hours, we are reluctant to use hours worked as an explanatory variable
in an earnings equation. Thus, in order to obtain a fairly homogeneous sample
as regards hours, we introduce restrictions on average weekly hours worked in
our sample selection. These restrictions are chosen in the form of an interval
[35, 42] which covers full time for different occupations, while still entailing some
variation in hours. As documented in Table AI, this causes substantial attrition.
An alternative would have been to impose the restriction in connection with the
precise occupation, but it would have entailed even more drastic attrition, due
to missing values.l
2.2 Schooling: pooling Germans and foreigners?
Two possibilities are basically available to describe initial human capital. One,
chosen by Gerlach and Stephan, consists in constructing a variable "years of
schooling". The other consists in directly using the information underlying the
construction of that variable. This is the route we choose, because we wish to
make full use ofthe information available on human capital (as Steiner and Wag-
ner, 1996, also do).2 However, as documented in Table A3, the variables needed
to describe the human capital of Germans and foreigners do not coincide. These
are the indicators "unskilled", "highskill", and "university entrancelevel" for the
Germans, and "unskilled" and "no degree" for the foreigners. The discrepancy
1 Knut Gerlach and Gesine Stephan kindly drew our attention to the fact that the variable
they use for weekly hours are not average weekly hours, but contract hours ("vereinbarte
Wochenarbeitszeit"), and that with their choice, over 90% of all observations fall in the [35,
42] interval. Different arguments can be advanced for thechoice ofone or the other measure -
see Bertschek et al. (1991) for a thorough discussion - but we still favour our choice, precisely
because contract hours do not properly reflect the heterogeneity in actual hours worked (for
instance, they do not include overtime work).
2 Again, Knut Gerlach and Gesine Stephan pointed to us that in constructing their "years of
schooling" variable, they made use of much more detailed information than that reflected in
the general and vocational indicators we use. Infact we also haveto aggregate some categories,
because otherwise we would include indicators for very few observations, which would more
or less amount to deleting them from the sample.
5is even reinforced if one considers interactions, not only between general and vo-
cational education, but also between these and regional information. This leads
us to estimate separate earnings equations for Germans and foreigners. This in
itself will entail no loss of power in the "test" of the efficiency wage hypothesis,
because there is no objection to pooling Germans and foreigners at the second
stage of the analysis. The notion that employers might pay efficiency wages to
one category of workers and not to the other would even seem extraordinary.
2.3 Potential and actual experience
There is a tradition in the empirical labour economics literature to avoid using
'a,~\\la\ ex})e;rlen~eas a regressor ina wage equation, onthe grounds that this poses
an endogeneity problem: as experience is past labour supply, any unobservable
individual characteristic that influences both the wage and the labour supply
will induce a correlation between the error term in the wage equation and that
regressor. On the other hand, potential experience is not entirely satisfactory
either as a proxy for acquired human capital, and causes a measurement error
problem. Since regressions are cheap, we do not choose a priori between these
two evils but duplicate the analysis. Furthermore, since we are not primarily
interested in measuring returns to experience as such, the endogeneity problem
is not important here, provided that the unobserved characteristics mentioned
above relate to human capital.
2.4 The role of tenure
The endogeneity of the tenure variable is more important in the context of this
study: as argued, among others, by Dustmann and Meghir (1997), the decision
to stay in a job is related to pay and it may seem a priori doubtful to include
tenure as an explanatory variable for earnings or wages if we want to relate the
residuals to the efficiency wage hypothesis. Again, we choose to be agnostic
here and carry out estimation both with and without the tenure variable. When
including tenure, we will allow for some amount of non-linearity by including
a linear spline, as Abowd et al. (1994) do: after looking at histograms for all
subsamples, we placed the join at 15 years of tenure.
62.5 Functional form
We follow the GS study and the bulk of the literature on wage and earnings
equations in choosing log earnings as the dependent variable, and a model with
additive error term. The regression model we consider has up to two continuous
explanatory variables, experience and eventually tenure, while the model consid-
ered by Gerlach and Stephan has three, with schooling the third one. In both
cases there is no reason a priori for linearity in these variables, and the GS study
even reports rejection of that assumption. This had motivated our interest for
non linear alternatives, in particular nonparametric regression and neural net-
work, as exemplified for wage equations by Lee et al. (1996) and models taking
account of the discrete nature of the "continuous" variables considered here -
all are measured in years - as in Bierens and Hartog (1988). However, it turns
out that non-linearity is not an issue for our subsamples
2.6 Heteroskedasticity and normality
Heteroskedasticity is not a real problem at the level ofestimation, whether or not
the regression function is linear, because least squares will produce a consistent
estimator of the parameters, and thus a consistent estimator of each residual.
When producing predicted wage premia it does matter, however. Indeed if the
error terms are normally distributed, the minimum mean square error prediction
of the wage premium is not simply the exponential of the residual but the expo-
nential of the sum of this residual and half its variance. Ifthe latter is constant,
the distribution of wage premia is just scaled down when ignoring this factor,
but it will be distorted in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Again the GS study
reports heteroskedasticity.
2.7 Choice of regressors
We choose to remain as close as possible to the inclusion of human capital vari-
ables only in the earnings equation. In particular we see no reason to include
firm or sector specific variables other than perhaps variables attempting to cap-
ture an "alternative wage". And even for the latter, we do not quite see the
rationale in this indirect test of the efficiency wage hypothesis. Thus we consider
7experience and its square, both interacted with all education indicators relevant
to the particular subsample ("unskilled", "high skill", and "university entrance
level" for the Germans, and "unskilled" and "no degree" for the foreigners). As
explained above, we also consider a linear spline for tenure. For the initial stock
of human capital, on top of the indicators for general and vocational education
mentioned above, we consider interactions between both these two groups and a
set of regional indicators (north, south, and three agglomeration size indicators).
We also take some limited account of cohort effects on the returns to education
by interacting the education indicators with two cohort indicators "born before
1938" and "born between 1938 and 1946", whereby the choice of boundaries was
based on inspection of histograms for the date of birth, so as to obtain roughly
equal groups. For each subsample separately we exclude all interactions for which
the proportion ofones is below 5%. The resulting lists can be read in Tables B1
and B2 which show regression results for Germans and foreigners for all years.
Note that, because of the exclusions above, the initial lists of regressors differ
.substantially for the two subsamples, as mentioned above.
Residuals from these regressions will be orthogonal to the human capital
variables in the sense of the empirical (sample) distribution: they will satisfy
u'X = O. However, there is an argument for going a step further and try and
generate residuals that will be orthogonal to human capital in the sense of the
actual distribution, by eliminating regressors that appear irrelevant (these will
approximately satisfy E (uIX) = 0). The corresponding residuals will exhibit
more variation than the former, and might for this reason prove better regressors
in the second stage of the analysis.
For each specification, we further assess the impact of possible outliers on
results by obtaining both OLS and trimmed least squares estimates. Summing
up, the second stage analysis will be performed for 48 (= 4 specifications x 2
initial/final x ·2 estimation methods x 3 years) sets of residuals. In the first
stage we estimate 96 sets of parameters (Germans and foreigners separately).
82.8 Using the panel structure of the data
Finally, using the panel structure of the data is not obviously attractive in our
situation. In principle it could both allow the identification of individual effects
and the realisation ofefficiency gains in estimation. But firstly, we are interested
in the residuals themselves and not in any decomposition, and secondly, efficiency
gains could only be realised under the assumption of (some) parameter stability
over time. As it will turn out, this may not be an attractive assltmption.
C;"
3. Estimated earnings equations and tests
Table~ 1 and 2 show estimation results for the final specification 2, including
actual experience and tenure.3 This is the result ofa limited specification search
where, starting from the complete list of regressors, we have kept all variables
that were significant for at least one year and one specification. While the list
of significant variables varies a lot from one year to the next, we found it to
be surprisingly stable across specifications and estimation methods. In the OL8
columns we report the heteroskedasticity robust t-values produced by 8HAZAM.
These correspond to the use of the unweighted squared residuals, and thus to
the variance estimator termed HCoby Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p.554),
and they should be considered as optimistic estimates.
Returns to experience appear concave and significant for the unskilled only.
Estimated returns to tenure for Germans amount in 1985 to some 1.5% p.a. for
the first 15 years, and 0.3% thereafter (the corresponding figures are 0.6% and
0.7% throughout for 1987 and 1989, respectively). For foreigners these returns
appear nil below 15 years and amount to some 0.8% thereafter, both for 1985 and
for 1987. For 1989 they are a little lower and insignificant. Being unskilled was
extremely disadvantageous for Germans in 1985, a year with record unemploy-
ment; it was less disadvantageous for foreigners, particularly in cities. Finally,
for Germans, university entrance level has a small positive impact throughout.
Note that the R2 increase over time, both for Germans and foreigners, which
is probably due to a loss of heterogeneity in the panel, but that they are much
3 All results have been obtained using the version 8.0 of SHAZAM.
9larger for Germans than for foreigners. For the trimmed least squares estimates,
the reported R2 is the squared correlation coefficient between observed and pre-
dicted log earnings, the predictions concerning all observations, whether or not
they were discarded in estimation. Outliers do not seem to pose an obvious
problem here.
Tables 3 and 4 show test results for the OLS estimates of all specifications. In
columns 1 and 2 we report p-values of heteroskedasticity tests with 1 and some
twenty degrees of freedom.4 Heteroskedasticity does not appear to be a serious
issue either. The only situation where a mild rejection of homoskedasticity ap-
pears to occur concerns foreigners in 1985 and perhaps in 1987, but the reported
numbers are maxima from three p-values obtained from Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey,
Harvey, and Glejser tests, and in each case only the Glejser test rejected. We
chose to ignore those rejections. Moreover, the LM test of normality consistently
rejects, so that we do not have had a clear guideline as to how to correct the
predicted wages (see subsection 2.6).
Column 3 reports the results of a RESET specification test. We report only
RESET(l), because in some occasions there were numerical difficulties with the
computation of RESET(2) or RESET(3). Again, we find no strong evidence
of non-linearity, which leads us to abandon our grand plans for dealing with
it. Note that this finding is at variance with what Gerlach and Stephan report
(footnote 1, p. 339). This may be because our smaller sample sizes do not
allow us to identify existing non-linearities, but it may also be due to the fact
that they ignore a large amount of heterogeneity, the latter interpretation being
substantiated by the findings of Lee et al. (1996).
Columns 4 to 7 report F tests of joint significance of different groups of vari-
ables. We will not comment these in detail,but draw attention to the significant
impact of the "unskilled" indicator that they suggest, especially for foreigners.
Finallythe R2show generally the same pattern as was already discussed for
the specification with actual experience and tenure, and they are largest for
4 As Godfrey and Grme (1997) demonstrate, there is a strong case for using bootstrap critical
values for these tests rather than relying on the asymptotic distribution of the test statistics,
as we do here.
10that specification - which does not say much about the endogeneity problems
mentioned above. But uncovering these problems is not our purpose here, and,
as we shall now see, the differences in estimates have almost no impact on second
stage results.
4. Test results concerning the efficiency wage
hypothesis
We have looked at kernel regressions of the dichotomous variables described in
Appendix A (see Table A4 and the corresponding text) on the wage premia
(exponentiated residuals from the earnings equations) and a constant, and at
confidence intervals based on twice the standard error derived from the kernel
estimate ofthe conditional variance using the same weights as the kernel estimate
of the conditional mean. In commenting on the profiles obtained we take these
confidence intervals into account. However, these regressions should be seen
only as a descriptive device, in particular we do not wish to imply any causal
relationships. Recall that in this second stage we do pool Germans and foreigners.
The results are bulky, since for each type of specification (initial/final) and
each year we have produced 64 graphs. As a kind of summary, Table 5 reports
the corresponding logit estimates for the specification with actual experience
and tenure (Table 6 reports the sample sizes and the proportions of ones for
each of the dependent dichotomous variables considered). However, there are
many similarities. The comparisons between OL8 and trim~ed least squares
results, and between initial and final specification, reveal no striking differences.
Across models (actual or potential experience, with or without tenure), the most
notable difference concerns the item "no participation in job-related decisions",
for which the relationship is essentially linearly decreasing for specification 1
(actual experience, no tenure), while it is slightly concave for the others.
Results for each item and each year can be summarised as follows. The sign
given after the denomination ofeach item shows the direction of the relationship
with the wage premium suggested by the efficiency wage hypothesis.
114.1 Career expectations
For this group ofitems, Gerlach and Stephan find significant results in accordance
with the efficiency wage hypothesis, onthe basis ofordered probit estimates. The
reason why we refrain from using an ordered-probit-type model here is that, given
our smallish sample sizes and the high proportions in one response modality, if
often happens that one ofthe other modalities is sufficiently under-represented to
cause numerical problems. Since, for purely practical reasons, we must avoid dis-
tinguishing different cases, we dichotomised the items. The ensuing information
loss,cannot be large, though.
No expected search for new job (+) We observe a non monotonous profile
for 1985, with two maxima and two minima, and a slightly increasing profile for
1987 and 1989. The logit results give positive but insignificant slope estimates.
No expected change of occupation (+) Again the profile is non monotonous
for 1985, it is flat for 1987, flat and then increasing for 1989. Logit estimates are
insignificant.
No expected exit from the labour force (+) The profile is decreasing then flat
for 1985, non monotonous for 1987, flat then increasing for 1989. For the logits,
the slope estimates are negative for 1985 (with a t-value of -1.7), positive for
1987 (t=1.2), nil for 1989.
Considerations basedon the efficiency wage hypothesis would leadto anticipate
an increasing relationship: for this group ofitems we do not find a single instance
which would provide support for that hypothesis, in contrast to the finding of
the GS study. It is perhaps worth stressing here that the large percentages of
ones reported in Table 6 for those items are not sufficient to expla\n this lack of
support, as the last item in the next list yields significant results with an even
higher percentage of ones.
4.2 Job characteristics
For this group of items we find a much better agreement with the results of
the GS study. That study reports rank correlations, with signs and relative
magnitudes that are compatible with what we find.
12Variety of tasks (+) For all years we find a positive relationship, with a
plateau for intermediate values, and significant estimated slopes.
No freedom to organise work (-) For all years we find a negative relationship,
with a plateau for 1985 and 1987, and significant estimated slopes.
Working time not related to work load (?) We find a flat profile for 1985 and
1989, an inverted U shape for 1987, and no significant slope (the large negative
coefficient given for 1989 in Table 5, with a t-value of -1.5, is driven by outliers
with large wage premia).
No stringent supervision (+) The profile is flat then increasing for 1985, in-
creasing with a plateau for 1987, and flat for 1989. Slopes are positive significant
for 1985 and 1987, insignificant for 1989.
No participation in job-related decisions (-) The profile is decreasing for all
years, linear for 1985 and 1987, and concave for 1989. The slopes, negative, have
large absolute values and are well determined.
4.3 Comparison between years
A priori one could expect the results for 1985 to provide the least evidence for effi-
ciency wages, because of the large unemployment that prevailed then - unless of
course one were to see efficiency wages as a main determinant of unemployment.
Indeed, this is also what we find, and 1989 is the year for which the confirmation
is the strongest. As regards job characteristics, the evolution from 1985 to 1989
described in Table 5 exactly replicates what Gerlach and Stephan report in their
Table 3, but there is some disagreement as to the relative position of 1987.
5. Where do the differel'lCeS come from?-
In this section we try tosee whatdrives the differences concerningthe relationship
between career expectations and wage premia between the GS study and ours.
First, starting from the same first stage results as above, we have produced
second stage results for Germans and foreigners separately. For foreigners, the
only significant relationship we find concerns the job characteristic "variety of
tasks" for 1989, with the expected sign. For Germans the results are very similar
13to the overall results presented above, but there is no significant relationship for
the career expectations. Otherwise, slopes become larger in absolute values, and
profiles steeper.
We have next looked at an extreme kind of pooling of Germans and foreigners
for the estimation of earnings equations, simply adding an indicator for nation-
ality. We had a new look at all interactions between the indicators in order to
determine which ones ought to be excluded at the outset (proportion of ones
below 5%), and we simply added an indicator for nationality. No specification
search was conducted. A striking difference with the results presented in Tables
1 and 2 and B1 and B2 is that here more or less the same coefficients remain
significant for the three years, and several ofthese concern variables that contrast
the two subsamples, like the "unskilled", "no degree" and "university entrance
level" indicators. Test results - as those reported in Table 3 - show no sin-
gle rejection of homoskedasticity or linearity for 1987 and 1989. For 1985 there
appears to be little heteroskedasticity, but linearity is rejected for all four speci-
fications. Second stage results for job characteristics are almost unchanged, but
there are some differences for the career expectations. For 1985, we obtain a near
significant slope for "no expected exit from the labour force", but the wrong sign
(t=-1.9). The corresponding profile is decreasing then flat, as previously. For
1987, all signs are positive and slopes are significant for "no expected search for
new job", but less so for the models including tenure among the regressors. How-
ever, for 1989 no relationship is significant and some are negative. The similarity
between results obtqined for job characteristics suggests that the problem does
not lie in a lack of power of our "test" due to insufficient sample size.
Our next step was to estimate the GS specification, both with and without
average weekly hours as a regressor. That is, we regressed log earnings on ex-
perience, experience squared, years of schooling, a "German" indicator and its
interaction with years of schooling, and a constant, combining again actual and
potential experience with tenure as described above - except that we considered
no spline. Test results are affected by the inclusion of hours of work. Without
hours, we observe again no rejection of homoskedasticity except for 1985 (mild
rejection for the specification with actual experience and no tenure), but rejection
14 .of linearity (with the exception of the two specifications without tenure for 1989,
and the specification with potential experience and no tenure for 1987). With
hours, homoskedasticity is (mildly) rejected for the specification with actual ex-
perience in 1985, and for all specifications except actual experience - no tenure in
1989; linearity is rejected for all specifications and all years - strongly in most
cases (p-values below 0.01) - except for actual experience - no tenure in 1985.
The second stage results again remain very similar as regards job characteristics,
whether or not we included hours of work. For career expectations the results
without hours were virtually identical to those obtained in the previous para-
graph, except for the models with tenure, were-slopes are no longer significant,
even for 1987 (t-values of 1.7). In~luding hours did not reinforce the difference
between these and our own results, so that our final impression is that the main
cause for the dis~repanciesbetween our results and those of the GS study lies in
their neglect of heterogeneity, manifested in the pooling of Germans and foreign-
ers, and in the pooling of workers with starkly different average working hours
- even though the sample appears to be quite homogeneous as regards contract
hours, see footnote 1.
6. Conclusion
Our re-analysis of the study by Gerlach and Stephan starts from the same un-
derlying data set but uses more homogeneous subsamples, in two respects: we
restrict average weekly working hours to a fairly narrow interval covering essen-
tially "full time" work, and estimate separate earnings equations for Germans
and foreigners. Furthermore, we make full use of the available information on ini-
tial human capital rather than describe the latter one-dimensionally by "years of
schooling". We also investigate different treatments ofthe experience and tenure
variables. In the end we reach the same conclusions as Gerlach and Stephan
concerning the relationship between job characteristics and wage premia, but
obtain diverging results as regards career expectations.
By pooling Germans and foreigners while keeping to a narrow range of hours
we obtain some limited convergence towards their results, as regards expected
15search, and that only for 1987 (also the year for which they found the most
significant results). Including average weekly hours of work in the regressions
deteriorates the specification test results, but it brings no notable change to the
second stage results, i.e. to the test of the efficiency wage hypothesis.
A tentative general conclusion we would like to draw is that there might be
substantial rewards for studies based on the GSOEP in avoiding to pool samples
A et B - or Germans and foreigners - where possible. This view should not
be understood as xenophobic, it rests on the different characteristics of the two
subsamples, from a purely statistical point of view.
Table 2: Regressions for the final specification
with actual experience and tenure, Foreigners
1985 1987 1989
OLS trim OLS trim OLS trim
4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
experience/l0 .093 .109 .138 .188 .075 .085
(1.2) (1.7) (1.9) (3.1) (.8) (1.2)
(experience/l0)*unskilled .063 .066 .073 .069 .057 .05]
(2.0) (2.4) (2.3) (2.3) (1.6) (l.5)
experience2/l00 -.021 -.025 -.037 -.046 -.020 -.02]
(-1.5) (-2.0) (-2.5) (-3.9) (-1.2) (-1.6)
(tenure/l0)*(tenure>15) .085 .057 .075 .096 .062 .064
(2.2) (1.3) (1.9) (2.7) (1.5) (1.7)
unskilled -.154 -.163 -.241 -.227 -.193 -.181
(-2.1) (-2.5) (-3.2) (-3.3) (-2.3) (-2.2)
unskilled*south .022 .027 .065 .072 .063 .069
(.7) (.9) (2.6) (2.6) (2.1) (2.4)
unskilled*city .106 .101 .086 .091 .•52 .160
(3.1) (3.0) (3.3) (3.1) (4.6) (5.0)
unskilled*born before ]947 -.140 -.126 -.082 -.095 -.119 -.117
(-3.2) (-3.1) (-2.3) (-2.3) (-2.4) (-2.7)
no degree*city -.021 -.017 .066 .067 .052 .050
(-.5) (-.4) (1.8) (1.7) (1.4) (1.3)
no degree *born before 1947 .162 -.153 -.095 -.075 -.082 -.079
(.5) (-.0) (-2.8) (-2.1) (-2.2) (-2.3)
constant 7.793 7.787 7.870 7.807 7.977 7.957
R2 .052 .049 .089 .087 .137 .136
16Table 1: Regressions for the final specification
with actual experience and tenure, Germans
1985 1987 1989
OLS trim OLS trim OLS trim
2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
experience/l0 -.041 -.011 .168 .154 .140 .124
(-.4) (-.1) (1.9) (2.3) (2.5) (2.0)
(experience/fO)*unskilled .853 .709 .139 .128 .278 .196
(3.2) (2.9) (.6) (.6) (1.2) (1.0)
(experience/lO)*high skill -.030 .006 .191 .188 -.051 -.026
(-.2) (.0) (1.5) (1.5) (-.4) (-.2)
experience2/100 -.000 -.005 -.033 -.030 -.028 -.026
(-.0) (-.4) -(-2.1) (-2.3) (-2.7) (-2.3)
(experience2/lOO)*unskilled -.145 -.122 -.021 -.019 -.041 -.026
(-3.1) (-2.7) (-.5) (-.5) (-1.1) (-.7)
(experience2/lOO)*high skill .002 -.007 -.054 -.054 -.012 -.018
(.1) (-.3) (-2.1) (-2.2) (-.5) (-.8)
tenure/lO .152 .141 .054 .057 .067 .071
(4.6) (4.8) (2.2) (2.2) (2.5) (2.8)
(tenure/lO)*(tenure>15) -.122 -.113 -.007 -.023 .025 .214
(-2.4) (-2.6) (-:2) (-.6) (.6) (.6)
unskilled -.388 -.375 -.551 -.466
1.291 1.067 (-1.2) (1.2) (-1.8) (-1-7)
(-3.5) (-3.3)
unskilled*north .079 .063 .116 .125 .061 .060
(1.5) (1.1) (2.2) (2.5) (1.2) (1.2)
high skill .107 .009 .030 .031 .310 .307
(.7) (.7) (.2) (.2) (2.3) (2.3)
high skill*bom before 1947 .170 .155 .074 .075 .138 .132
(2.0) (2.0) (1.20 (1.1) (1.6) (1.9)
university entrance level .243 .241 .265 .260 .246 .250
(4.3) (5.1) (5.7) (6.1) (5.3) (5.6)
constant 7.910 7.879 7.793 7.801 7.861 7.877
R2 .296 .295 .321 .320 .348 .347
17Table 3: Test results for OLS estimation and all initial specifications, Germans: p-values
het 1 het 2 rst(1) exp exp2 vd1 vd2 R2
1985
actual experience .874 .394 .871 .010 .008 .052 .404 .252
act. expo and tenure .999 .343 .422 .016 .018 .091 .369 .303
potential experience .924 .739 .774 .020 .034 .252 .971 .246
pot. expo and tenure .819 .690 .824 .109 .207 .203 .860 .293
1987
actual experience .566 .710 .533 .004 .006 .016 .716 .309
act. expo and tenure .690 .415 .846 .031 .015 .017 .765 .328
potential expe,rience .838 .912 .767 .212 .178 .004 .783 .296
pot. expo and tenure .779 .697 .832 .561 .414 .007 .796 .317
1989
actual experience .590 .186 .792 .004 .008 .528 .236 .298
act. expo and tenure .459 .415 .288 .035 .008 .243 .231 .355
potential experience .718 .912 .761 ;297 .347 .320 .669 .286
pot. expo and tenure .480 .697 .964 .571 .422 .150 .721 .341
Notes: Column hecl gives the smallest p-value obtained with the one-degree-of freedom tests associated with
regressions of the square residual on the predicted dependent variable, on its square and on the log of ist square.
Column het_2 gives the smallest p-value obtained with the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, Harvey and Glejser tests,
with 20 or 22 degrees of freedom, depending on the presence of tenure. Column rst(l) gives the p-value of a
RESET(l) test, a linearity test. The next four columns report on F-tests for the joint significance of coefficients
affecting the variables indicated. Variable vdl (vocational degree) corresponds to "unskilled", vd2 to "high
skill". The last columns reports the R2 ofthe corresponding regression.
Table 4: Test results for OLS estimation and all initial specifications, Foreigners: p-values
het 1 het 2 rst(l) exp exp2 vd1 gdl R2
1985
actual experience .488 .019 .671 .305 .570 .000 .398 .058
act. expo and tenure .241 .018 .724 .315 .517 .000 .432 .065
potential experience .685 .025 .146 .417 .532 .008 .566 .051
pot. expo and tenure .546 .009 .367 .359 .426 .009 .545 .063
1987
actual experience .975 .023 .262 .168 .132 .000 .219 .090
act. expo and tenure .887 .021 .148 :-248 .157 .000 .354 .098
potential experience .874 .109 .957 .560 .388 .005 .189 .082
pot. expo and tenure .872 .056 .616 .737 .481 .006 .288 .092
1989
actual experience .854 .699 .038 .288 .545 .000 .036 .155
actual experience and .775 .689 .025 .405 .649 .000 .030 .165
tenure
potential experience .788 .505 .115 .426 .379 .000 .097 .155
pot. expo and tenure .554 .468 .156 .563 .465 .000 .081 .170
Notes: Column heCI gives the smallest p-value obtained with the one-degree-of freedom tests associated with
regressions of the square residual on the predicted dependent variable, on its square and on the log of ist square.
Column het_2 gives the smallest p-value obtained with the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, Harvey and Glejser tests.
with 19 or 21 degrees of freedom, depending on the presence of tenure. Column rst( I) gives the p-value of a
RESET( I) test, a linearity test. The next four columns report on F-tests for the joint significance of coefficients
affecting the variables indicated. Variable vd I (vocational degree) corresponds to "unskilled", gd I (general
degree) to "no degree". The last columns reports the R2 ofthe corresponding regression.
18Table 5: Binary logits for the initial specification
with actual experience and tenure (Germans and foreigners together).
No expect. search for new job (+)
No expect. change ofoccup. (+)
No expect. exit from lab. force(+)
Variety oftasks(+)
No freedom to organise work(-)
Work time not related to load (?)
No stringent supervision (+)




























Notes: The first panel concerns expectations over the next two years, the second
panel concerns characteristics of the present job. The sign in parentheses after
each item's denomination-corresponds to what the efficiency wage hypothesis
leads us to expect. For each item the first entry gives the slope estimate in a
logit regression on a constant and the wage premium (the second gives the
corresponding t-statistic).
Table 6: Number ofobservations and proportion ofones for binary variables
summarising career expectations and job characteristics
(Germans and foreigners together).
No expected search for new job
No expected change ofoccupation
No expected exit from labour force
Variety oftasks
No freedom to organise work
Work time not related to work load
No stringent supervision





























Notes: The first panel concerns expectations over the next two years, the second
panel concerns characteristics ofthe presentjob. For each item the first entry
gives the number ofobservations (and the second the proportion ofones).
19Appendix A: Data
The data used are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for
the years 1985, 1987 and 1989. The sample selection is described in Table AI.
Large losses in observations occur for the restrictions on average weekly hours
worked and on occupation type. A significant loss also occurs for the "tenure"
variable, as discussed further down. The resulting sample sizes are much smaller
than in the GS study (1704, 1623 and 1718, respectively). The wage concept
retained here is monthly gross earnings inthe month preceding the interview. For
the purpose of this study this may be inferior to the measure used for instance by
Steiner and Wagner (1996), average monthly gross earnings in the last calendar
year: this also includes fringe benefits such as 13th and 14th month, and holiday
and Christmas bonuses. Our choice was guided by two considerations: we wanted
to avoid losing further observations due to missing values on the various benefits,
and we found it convenient to use the same measure as Gerlach and Stephan, for
ease of comparison.
Initial human capital accumulation is described by four indicators, two for
general education and two for vocational education. The indicators for gen-
eral education are "no degree" (gd1) and "university entrance level" (gd2) (the
reference category is "intermediate secondary"). The indicators for vocational
education are "no vocational degree" (vd1) - which we will abbreviate into "un-
skilled" - and a "high skill" category (vd2), which it is easiest to define starting
from the reference category, as the latter is "apprenticeship".
For experience, we consider in turns two variables. One is the familiar po-
tential experience, defined as age - 6 - years of schooling, where the latter are
approximated - following to some extent Steiner and Wagner (1996) - as de-
scribed in Table A2. This approximation is much less precise for foreigners than
it is for the Germans, as there is also some approximation in the definition of the
indicators for the former. The other variable is actual experience, defined as the
number of years of full time employment. This is not automatically smaller than
the potential experience defined above, as one might expect, and indeed it turns
out that for all subsamples a significant proportion of individuals exhibits an ac-
20tual experience which is slightly larger than potential experience. In fact, while
years of schooling are underestimated for people who repeat some classes, they
are overestimated for those who obtain degrees or qualifications while working.
Setting the age of school begin at 6 is also a source of error.
The variable "tenure", defined as number of years with the current employer
does not appear to require any comment. Yet it turns out that this exceeds
actual experience for a substantial number of observations. In such cases we
have checked the possibility that the date of hire in the current job (two digits)
is actually the tenure itself. We have made the corresponding adjustment where
possible, and discarded the observation otherwise.
Regional information is used only in interactions with the former variables.
Due to the federal structure of the State in Germany, there is some variability
in curricula and standards across federal states (Lander), to the point that de-
grees are not automatically recognised across state borders. Moreover, it can
be expected that the market value of degrees and qualifications varies with the
degree of urbanisation. We thus consider two sets of indicators, one opposing
the north (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Schelswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony and
North-Rhine Westphalia) and the south (Bavaria and Baden-Wiirttemberg) to
the central states (Hessia, Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate), the other dis-
tinguishing agglomeration sizes (population below twenty thousands, twenty to
hundred thousands, one hundred to five hundred thousands, and above half a
million).
Table A3 gives summary statistics on all those variables year by year and
for Germans and foreigners separately. The GSOEP consists of two separate
samples, termed sample A and sample B. The latter is desig~ed to represent
the immigrant work force, and is oversampled compared to sample A. However,
there are also foreigners in sample A, and Germans in sample B, presumably
following naturalisation. The distinction we make is not between samples A and
B but between Germans and foreigners, and we do not takesampling weights into
account. Given our framework of conditional models, this is of no consequence
- the situation would be different if we were to consider distributional aspects,
like studying inequality. The numbers in Table A3 reflect only the composition
21of our samples, not the underlying populations.
Some differences between Germans and foreigners are worth noting. Earnings,
actual experience and tenure are larger for the Germans. The foreigners are
more concentrated in densely populated areas and in the south. But it is for the
education variables that the largest differences occur. The category "no degree"
is almost non-existent for the Germans, but concerns well over a quarter of the
foreigners. "University entrance level" concern less than 10% of Germans, but
less than 1% of foreigners. Similar contrasts can be observed for qualifications.
Table A4 gives information on the questions that have been chosen in the GS
study as informative as regards efficiency wages. After looking at histograms of
the answers, we have decided to dichotomise the questions and have reformulated
these so as to make clear what modality we have coded as 1. For instance the
entry "no freedom to organise work" is derived from the original item "job is
characterised by freedom to organise work", with the three answer modalities
"1: true", "2: partially true", and "3: not true": as indicated in the first column
of the table, we have chosen to code 1 for modality 3, and 0 for the other 2,
and reformulated accordingly. The first panel shows items related to career
expectations over the next two years (with 4 original modalities) and the second
panel shows items related to job characteristics (3 original modalities). After the
description of each item, we have shown the sign of the expected relationship
with the wage premium, as derived from the efficiency wage hypothesis.5 Thus
we anticipate that "no expected search for new job", "no expected change of
occupation" and "no expected exit from the labour force" should relate positively
to the wage premia - although less directly so for the third one; the same
should apply for jobs with a "variety of tasks" or "no stringent supervision",
whereas we expect the reverse for jobs with "no freedom to organise work" or
"no participation in job-related decisions". We must admit that the status of
jobs with "working time not related to work load" with respect to the efficiency
5 Compensating differentials (at least for job characteristics) would result in the opposite
sign.
22wage hypothesis is not clear to us.6 Entries in the second column record which
original modality we have recoded as 1. Entries in subsequent columns report the
proportions of ones. In the upper panel, corresponding to career expectations,
the proportions are high throughout, bothfor Germans and for foreigners. This is
true also for the last line of the second panel, where most Germans, and virtually
all foreigners report the absence of participation in job-related decisions. It is
worth noting that such asymmetric answers make it a priori more difficult to
identify patterns from this dichotomous information than if the proportion of
ones were nearer to 0.5. The answers are more differentiated in the rest of the
second panel, where some strong discrepancies_between the answers of Germans
and foreigners appear. The latter report less variety of tasks, less freedom to
organise work, and more supervision. For this reason we will also analyse the
two subsamples separately.
Table AI: Sample Selection
1985 1987 1989
cases % loss cases % loss cases % loss
full sample 11 090 10516 9710
males 5459 50.78 5208 50.48 4780
age 30-65 3 393 37.85 3 204 38.48 2 923
full time 2829 16.62 2691 16.01 2259
occupation 2 239 20.86 2 126 21.00 1 802
earnings> 0 2 113 5.63 2037 4.19 1704
hours> 34 < 43 1 151 45.53 1 243 38.98 1020
regional info. compl. 1 151 1 243 1020
tenure non missing 1 116 3.04 1 186 4.59 1007
experience non miss. 1087 2.60 1 134 4.38 935
tenure plausible 963 11.40 1018 10.23 819










Notes: The 'full time' indication corresponds to one modality of a 'labour market status
variable'. The 'occupation' restriction selects 'workers' and 'employees' (it excludes the self-
employed, the civil servants, etc.). For 'tenure plausible', please refers to the text.
6 This is also the item for which Gerlach and Stephan find the lowest correlations with the
wage premia, although these correlations are still significantly different from zero. We found
no significant result for this variable.
23Table A2: Years of schooling










Table A 3· Descriptive statistics· (1) Germans ..
1985 1987 1989
(507) (537) (496)
mean min max mean min max mean mm max
gross wage (DM) 3196 1000 10000 3415 1200 10300 3610 1300 9300
actual expo (years) 26.3 2 46 26.9 4 48 26.9 6 51
pot. expo (years) 27.5 6 47 27.9 6 45 27.8 8 46
tenure (years) 14.8 1 40 15.4 0 39 15.3 1 41
cohort 1939 1920 1955 1940 1922 1957 1944 1926 1959
urbanisation
pop. 20'-100' .078 0 1 .100 0 1 .117 0 1
pop. 100'-500' .169 0 1 .168 0 1 .167 0 1
pop. > 500' .467 0 1 .464 0 1 .454 0 1
region
north .471 0 1 .462 0 1 .472 0 1
south .327 0 1 .322 0 1 .300 0 1
schooling
no degree 0 0 0 .004 0 1 .002 0 1
univ. entr. level .092 0 1 .093 0 1 .077 0 1
skill group
unskilled .116 0 1 .126 0 1 .t'29 0 1
high.,skill .195 0 1 .188 0 1 .181 0 1
Note: North IS BerlIn, Schleswig-Holstem, Hamburg, Nlerdersachen, Bremen and Nordrhem-West-
falen. South is Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayern.
24Table A.3: Descriptive statistics: (2) Foreigners.
1985 1987 1989
(455) (480) (323)
mean min max mean min max mean min max
gross wage (DM) 2701 1000 5000 2898 900 6500 3129 1300 6500
actual expo (years) 24.7 5 47 25.2 4 49 26.6 6 45
pot. expo (years) 27.2 12 47 27.8 7 47 28.8 9 46
tenure (years) 11.7 1 38 13.3 0 40 14.0 1 29
cohort 1941 1921 1955 1942 1922 1957 1943 1926 1959
urbanisation
pop. 20'-100' .077 0 1 .071 0 1 .071 0 1
pop. 100'-500' .211 0 1 .187 0 1 .192 0 1
pop. > 500' .547 0 1 .558 0 1 .545 0 1
region
north .374 0 1 .360 - 0 1 .322 0 1
south .415 0 1 .431 0 1 .486 0 1
schooling
no degree .297 0 1 .256 0 1 .272 0 1
univ. entr. level .007 0 1 .008 0 1 .009 0 1
skill group
unskilled .473 0 1 .483 0 1 .520 0 1
high-skill .009 0 1 .015 0 1 .006 0 1
Note: North IS BerlIn, Schleswlg-Holstem, Hamburg, Nlerdersachen, Bremen and Nordrhem-West-
falen. South is Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bayem.
Table A4: Modality and proportion for binary variables summarising career
expectations and jobcharacteristics(for Germans and foreigners separately)
mod. 1985 1987 1989
Ger. for. Ger. for. Ger. for.
No expo search for new job (+) 4 .770 .799 .738 .804 .651 .823
No expo change ofoccup. (+) 4 .821 .954 .769 .822 .778 .860
No expo exit labour force (+) 4 .833 .867 .779 .868 ..778 .898
Variety oftasks (+) I .581 .234 .583 .238 .583 .263
No freedom to org.ork (-) 3 .176 .610 .207 .608 .183 .550
Work time not reI. to load (?) 3 .525 .668 .537 .659 .584 .620
No stringent supervision (+) 3 .533 .311 .516 .305 .466 .320
No part.injob-reI. decisions (-) 3 .782 .928 .811 .924 .792 .935
Note: The sign after each item-illdicates the expected direction ofthe relationship with the wage
premium, under the efficiency wage hypothesis.
25Appendix B: Further Regression Results
Table B1: Regressions for initial specification with actual experience and tenure, Germans
1985 1987 1989
OLS trim OLS trim OLS trim
3% 2% 2.5%
experience/l0 -.042 .024 .160 .126 .144 .132
(-.4) (.3) (1.8) (1.8) (2.5) (2.2)
(experience/lO)*unskilled .852 .647 .120 .256 .266 .205
(3.3) (2.6) (.5) (1.1) (1.2) (1.0)
(experience/lO)*high skill -.042 -.103 .082 -.023 -.095 -.031
(-.2) (-.4) (.4) (-.1) (-.7) (-.2)
(experience/I0)* university entrance .029 -.691 .102 .222 .052 -.060
level (.1) (-.3) (.5) (1.3) (.3) (-.3)
experience2/100 -.000 -.011 -.032 -.026 -.029 -.027
(-.0) (-.7) (-1.9) (-2.0) (-2.7) (-2.5)
(experience2/100)*unskilled -.150 -.108 -.010 -.028 -.039 -.025
(-3.2) (-2.4) (-.3) (-.7) (-1.0) (-.6)
(experience2/loo)*high skill -.000 .005 -.038 -.023 -.014 -.022
(-.0) (.1) (-1.0) (-.7) (-.4) (-.7)
(experience2 /1OO)* university -.004 .020 -.015 -.033 -.010 .016
entrance level (-.0) (.4) (-.3) (-.9) (-.3) (.4)
tenure/lO .155 .139 .057 .578 .067 .067
(4.6) (4.7) (2.3) (2.2) (2.5) (2.8)
(tenure/lO)*(tenure>15) -.128 -.127 -.013 -.019 .024 .021
(-2.5) (-2.9) (-.3) (-.5) (.6) (.6)
unskilled - -1.313 -1.15 -.404 -.660 -.510 -.449
(-3.6) (-3.3) (-1.3) (-2.1) (-1.7) (-1.6)
unskilled*city .095 .073 .079 .082 -.073 -.071
(1.5) (1.2) (1.4) (1.5) (-1.3) (-1.3)
unskilled*north .062 .045 .067 .086 .091 .084
(Ll) (.7) (1.1) (1.5) (1.6) (1.6)
unskilled* born before 1938 .070 .006 -.091 .079 -.016 -.047
(.9) (.1) (-1.4) (-1.1) (-.2) (-.6)
high skill .115 .171 .121 .328 .350 .282
(.4) (.6) (.5) (1.8) (2.3) (1.5)
high skill*city .325 .066 .045 .010 .027 .0580
(.6) (1.4) (1.0) (.2) (.6) (1.3)
high skill*north -.020 -.003 .049 -.007 .014 -.014
(-.2) (-.0) (.7) (-.1) (.2) (-.3)
high skill*south -.Oot .012 .339 -.008 .648 .069
(-.0) (.2) (.5) (-.1) (1.2) (1.3)
high skill*born before 1938 .230 .273 .112 .126 .196 .169
(1.8) (2.3) (1.0) (1.1) (1.4) (1.4)
high skill*born 1938-1946 .169 .190 .100 .112 .152 .148
(1.8) (2.3) (1.4) (1.4) (1.7) (2.1)
high skill* university entrance level .100 .069 -.077 -.038 -.101 -.103
(.7) (.6) (-.8) (-.4) (-1.2) (-1.1)
university entrance level .116 .219 .175 -.036 .257 .380
(.4) (.7) (1.0) (-.2) (1.5) (2.0)
constant 7.910 7.837 7.799 7.842 7.854 7.870
R2 .303 .297 .328 .320 .355 .352
26Table B2: Regressions for initial specification with actual experience and tenure, Foreigners
1985 1987 1989
OLS trim OLS trim OLS trim
4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
experience/lO .064 .133 .152 .214 -.022 -.046
.(.6) (1.5) (1.3) (2.5) (-1) (-.4)
(experience/1O)*unskilled .166 .127 .056 -.024 .045 .109
(1.1) (.8) (.3) (-.2) (.2) (.7)
(experience/l0)* no degree -.152 -.073 -.092 -.109 .317 .494
(-.8) (-.4) (-.5) (-.6) (1.3) (2.1)
experience2f100 -.014 -.029 -.041 -.052 -.001 .003
(-.7) (-1.6) (-1.7) (-3.0) (-.0) (.2)
(experience2/ 100)*unskilled -.016 -.010 .003 .014 -.002 -.014
(-.6) (-.3) (.1) (.5) (-.0) (-.5)
(experience2/100)* no degree .026 .016 .021 .022 -.041 -.072
(.8) (.5)- (.7) (.7) (-1.0) (-1.7)
tenure .015 .005 .030 .015 .042 .033
(.5) (.2) (.9) (.5) (.9) (1.0)
(tenure/lO)*(tenure>15) .055 .089 .025 .064 -.002 -.007
(.9) (1.5) (.4) (1.2) (-.0) (-.1)
unskilled -.277 -.228 -.196 -.058 -.189 -.449
(-1.4) (-1.2) (-.9) (-.3) (-.8) (-1.3)
unskilled*north .006 .002 -.018 -.032 .017 -.012
(.1) (.0) (-.4) (-.7) (.4) (-.3)
unskilled*south .007 .023 .068 .041 .071 .059
(.2) (.5) (1.6) (.9) (1.6) (1.3)
unskilled*city .096 .087 .078 .086 .156 .169
(2.5) (2.5) (2.8) (2.8) (4.4) (5.3)
unskilled*bom before 1938 -.194 -.174 -.097 -.087 -.107 -.091
(-2.3) (-2.7) (-2.0) (-1.4) (-1.3) (-1.4)
unskilled* born 1938-1946 -.160 -.157 -.095 -.112 -.078 -.089
(-3.2) (-3.2) (-2.5) (-2.3) (-1.2) (-1.8)
no degree .146 .035 .054 .091 -.382 -.643
(.6) (.2) (.2) (.4) (-1.2) (-2.0)
no degree*north -.075 -.073 -.008 .025 -.133 -.082
(-1.5) (-1.3) (-.1) (.4) (-2.5) (-1.4)
no degree*south -.016 -.051 -.048 -.010 -.109 -.107
F (-.3) (-.9) (-.7) (-.2) (-2.0) (-1.8)
no degree*city -.000 .004 .078 .088 .048 .009
(-.0) (.1) (1.8) (1.9) (.9) (.2)
no degree *bom before 1938 .045 -.005 -.074 -.090 -.229 -.192
(.4) (-.0) (-.8) (1.0) (-2.3) (-2.2)
no degree* born 1938-1946 .088 .057 -.057 -.028 -.185 -.163
(1.3) (.8) (-.8) (-.4) (-2.2) (-2.3)
no degree* unskilled .063 .089 .012 -.026 .047 .053
(1.4) (1.9) (.3) (-.6) (.9) (1.1)
constant 7.816 7.749 7.831 7.767 8.050 8.090
R2 .065 .060 .098 .090 .165 .156
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